019 - Prelude to the First Punic War

Hello, and welcome to the History of Rome, episode 19, Prelude to the First Punic War. When we last left the Romans, they had driven King Pyrrhus back to Greece and secured complete control of the Italian peninsula. As you may recall, Pyrrhus, exhausted from his battles with the Romans, had briefly moved his army to Sicily, where he attempted to establish a kingdom for himself. He found allies among the Greek colonies on the eastern half of the island, but found enemies amongst the Carthaginians who had settled the western half. Pyrrhus had been successful in Sicily, but was never able to completely dislodge the Carthaginians from the island. He had every intention of widening his war by invading Africa, but a near revolt by his Sicilian-Greek allies caused him to instead abandon Sicily altogether. As he sailed away, Pyrrhus made a prescient comment, the veracity of which is dubious, like every other direct quote from the ancient world, but is worth relaying. The Greek king, a veteran of the post-Alexandrian dynastic struggles of the eastern Mediterranean, knew an inevitable great power confrontation when he saw one. Sicily lay equidistant between Rome and Carthage, and was too rich not to be coveted by both. So, while watching the island recede in the distance, he said, What a field we are leaving for the Romans and Carthaginians to exercise their arms. Ten years after sailing from Italy for good, Pyrrhus's prediction bore out and the two great powers, Rome and Carthage, were at war in Sicily.

But before we get too far into this, we should address the question of who the Carthaginians were, and why we call their long struggle with Rome the Punic Wars, and not something easier to remember, like, I don't know, the Carthaginian Wars, like we do with the Samnite Wars, and the Latin War, and the Macedonian Wars, which you can tell just by looking at the name were fought against the Samnites, and the Latins, and the Macedonians. To start with the obvious, the Carthaginians come from Carthage, a city on the north coast of Africa near modern-day Tunis. They were primarily a trade-based empire, and by the time the Punic Wars rolled around, they were the leading economic power in the western Mediterranean. Carthage was founded around 800 BC by Phoenician settlers. The word Punic is a derivative of the Latin word for Phoenician, and it's what the Romans themselves called the Carthaginians. So today, we learn about the Punic Wars rather than the Carthaginian Wars.

The Phoenicians were the strongest maritime power of their day, and are remembered most of all for providing one of the first written alphabets in history. They spread their influence across the Mediterranean by establishing a series of autonomous colonies from modern Lebanon to the Straits of Gibraltar. Any sense of political solidarity between the new cities quickly vanished, but economically they formed the backbone of a new trans-Mediterranean trade network that persists even to this day. In the western Mediterranean, Carthage soon became the richest city, owing to its favorable geographic position located along the narrow strait between Africa and Sicily. Essentially, to get from here to there in the Mediterranean, you had to sail right by Carthage, so it quickly became a hub of commercial activity and rich as a result.

Politically, the Carthaginian government was a mixed oligarchy. There was a people's assembly, but it was mostly ceremonial and rarely called upon to make important decisions. The real power lay in the Senate, a body made up of the richest families in Carthage. And the real, real power lay with a council of a hundred within the Senate made up of the richest and most distinguished senators. The Senate elected the chief executive of Carthage, the Suffet, who served annually with minimal constraints on power. The only aspect of Carthaginian life the Suffet did not control was, interestingly, the army, which was left to a professional corps of generals. This is obviously a marked contrast to the Romans, who elected their executives primarily to lead their armies, with every other function serving almost as an afterthought.

The other major contrast between the Romans and Carthaginians politically was that the Carthaginians did not suffer the kind of class conflict that forever plagued Rome. Access to the aristocracy, and therefore power, was based entirely on wealth. This makes sense given the primarily commercial focus of their empire. If you were poor and made yourself rich, you were invited into the Senate, and if you were rich and lost all your money, you were kicked out. It was pretty much that simple. It is for this reason that the People's Assembly in Carthage did not have nearly the clout that its corollary in Rome did. There was no lingering discrimination of new wealth by old families, so there was no real sense of disenfranchisement by men with money who would have otherwise driven democratic political reform. The way to get ahead in Carthage was to make money. Nobody cared if you made it last week or ten generations back. And if you didn't have money, there wasn't a whole lot you could do to change the system. All of this contrasted with the political history of Rome, and it left the two empires with very different worldviews.

But this contrast was nothing compared to their views on the role of the armed forces. The Roman legions were made of Roman citizens and led by Roman citizens. Military service was obligatory in Rome, and the most important contribution to civil society a citizen could make. Carthage, however, had no such tradition. Led primarily by businessmen and not warriors, the Carthaginians contracted out the work and hired mercenaries to fight their wars for them. There was a small contingent of professional Carthaginian soldiers who led the army, but the actual fighting was done by Numidian cavalry, Spanish infantry, and Balearic slingers, all paid for out of the great Carthaginian treasury. There are more than a few who argue that the distinction between the citizen army of Rome and the mercenary army of Carthage was the deciding factor in the wars between these two otherwise equal powers. This is probably an oversimplification, but the distinction should be kept in mind as we go forward.

Now historians hate to talk about inevitabilities and consider it an insult when anyone starts talking about how this or that historical event was destined to occur, and the Punic Wars are no different. It is easy to say in passing that the conflict between Rome and Carthage was inevitable and simply move on, but things are never so easy. There are many, many steps on the path to war, and if either Rome or Carthage had acted differently at any one of those steps, they may have indeed avoided the armed conflict that embroiled them for so long. But in the end, come on, let's face it, a war between them was inevitable. They were two economic and political powerhouses whose territorial boundaries bordered one another. What did you think was going to happen? When Pyrrhus was driven from Italy and the Romans finally held the peninsula free and clear, the countdown was on for a war between Rome and Carthage. The only thing missing was a catalyst, that minor event in that insignificant place that has been starting great power wars for millennia, from the revolt in Epidomnus to the assassination of Archduke Ferdinand in Sarajevo.

In the case of the Punic Wars, it was the situation in the small Sicilian city of Messana, present-day Messina, that sealed the deal. The backstory to that situation is that a group of mercenaries from Campania, called the Mamertines, had been hired by Agathocles, the king of Syracuse, to fight his war with the Carthaginians for control of Sicily between 315 and 305 BC. A stalemate peace had been reached by 300 that divided the island between Greek and Carthaginian interests, with Messana ceded to Carthage. When Agathocles died in 289 BC, his Italian mercenaries were left unpaid and unemployed, never a good combination. The mercenaries took a shine to Messana and decided to seize control of the city for themselves and see if anyone would stop them. Messana lay on the east coast of the island and the Carthaginian garrison was not large or easily supplied. So when the Mamertines overran the city, the Carthaginians could only watch helplessly.

The Mamertines held the city for a decade or so, living fat off the land, but knowing they were in a precarious situation, joined in the call for Pyrrhus to come to the island and drive the Carthaginians out once and for all in 278 BC. When the Greek king's rule began to reek of tyranny, the Mamertines then joined in the subsequent call for Pyrrhus to please go back where he came from. Over the course of the next decade, the major shift in Sicilian power politics was the rise of Hiero in Syracuse and his ambition to control the whole island. In the department of strange bedfellows, the rise of Hiero threatened both the Mamertines and the Carthaginians, so in 265 BC, the Mamertines formally requested a Carthaginian garrison for their city to help them fight off Hiero and the request was granted. But the Mamertines, apparently the most fickle ruling class in history, immediately regretted inviting the Carthaginians in and cast about for someone to help them drive out their new allies.

There was no one in Sicily who could help them, so the Mamertines looked back to their homeland and requested aid from the greatest power of all, Rome. The Romans were divided on how to react. There were moral as well as practical reasons to deny the request. Arguments for and against the idea were raised, with support for aid coming from backers of the Claudii family, who, coincidentally, held land and power in the south, and arguments against the idea coming from supporters of the Fabii family, who argued Rome should expand north, where they, again coincidentally, held the majority of the land and power. This did not detract from the arguments themselves, it is just interesting to note who embraced what argument and why.

The Fabii were quick to point out two important reasons for denying aid, one moral and one practical. Morally, they reminded the Senate of the recent seizure of Regium by legionaries just a few years before. In the aftermath of the Pyrrhic Wars, a group of Roman soldiers had taken control of the Greek city which lay in the extreme toe of Italy, and declared themselves autonomous oligarchs. The Romans had taken a dim view of this at the time, and in 270 BC retook Regium, marching the rebels back to Rome and beheading them in full view of the public. The Fabii argued that for Rome to now come to the aid of a group who so closely mirrored the group from Regium would show the Romans to be abject hypocrites. The second point, as succinct as it was practical, went like this. Helping the Mamertines meant fighting the Carthaginians, and fighting the Carthaginians was a really, really bad idea.

The Claudii, however, argued that the Carthaginians were already pressing at Rome's doorstep, having taken up positions in Sicily and Sardinia and Corsica, the large islands laying off the Italian coast. If Rome did not do something soon to head off the Carthaginians, Rome would find itself and its Italian empire surrounded by the more powerful Carthaginians. The time to act was now, before Carthage solidified its position. The immediate strategic importance of controlling Massana, and thus the straits between Italy and Sicily, was obvious, but the larger strategic imperative of checking Carthaginian encroachment was just as important. Plus, they said, the Carthaginians were so bogged down trying to pacify Spain that they probably would not even react to a Roman foray into Sicily. On this last count, they were completely mistaken, but in the end, the Claudii, filling the Senate with visions of an easy victory and irresistible Roman expansion, carried the day.

The Senate ordered one of the consuls for the year, Appius Claudius, yes, another Appius Claudius, to raise two legions and sail for Sicily. But Claudius, recognizing that time was of the essence, dispatched one of his cousins to immediately secure passage for a smaller force on Greek ships chartered from Tarentum. This smaller force could set out at once for Massana and, with a little luck, secure the city before the Carthaginians knew what had occurred. Once Massana was in Roman hands, the consul Claudius would follow with the two full legions and relieve the expeditionary force. This advanced Roman brigade landed in Sicily without a hitch and marched to the Mamertines' aid. Upon hearing the news that the Roman army was at the gates, the commander of the Carthaginian garrison immediately began to make preparations for a fight, but seeing the Mamertines welcome the Romans with open arms, realized he was in it in a bad way and withdrew from the city.

The conquest of Massana had thus been a bloodless affair, but the ease of victory for the Romans was almost certainly a result of Carthaginian restraint rather than any weakness of arms. The east coast of Sicily was the last outpost of Carthaginian control, and there were no standing orders in place to cover a sudden Roman invasion. The prudent naval commander, seeing the Romans cross the strait, likely decided it was best to leave the small Roman force alone and wait for instructions from home rather than spark a full-scale war by immediately attacking. The Carthaginian senate was apoplectic when they heard the news of the Roman invasion, and recalled the leader of the Massana garrison and crucified him, literally, for his failure to defend the city. Carthage reacted with far more vigor than the Romans had estimated, and the Carthaginians immediately directed their armies to Massana with orders to nip this Roman menace in the bud. Just as Appius Claudius arrived in Sicily with his two legions, the Carthaginian armies reached Massana, and, just like that, the First Punic War was on, whether either side really wanted it or not.

Next week, we will get into the guts of the First Punic War, or as it might just as easily be called, the War for Sicily, as all the action takes place on and around the island. There would be triumphs for both sides, but as much as the Second Punic War was defined by great generalship, the First Punic War is actually defined by bumbling, incompetence, and missed opportunities by the leadership of both armies. The Romans would eventually win this sloppily played game, but their victory would do nothing more than guarantee that another, far bloodier conflict would be fought as soon as the two, now mortal enemies, caught their breath.