023c - The War With Hannibal

Hello, and welcome to the History of Rome. After the utter devastation of Cannae, no one would have blamed the Romans had they just given up. The history of the world could have very easily read something like, But after the defeat at Cannae, the Romans surrendered. They had been beaten soundly over and over again by Hannibal, and on their own turf no less. The Romans agreed to terms, and their just recently acquired empire was shattered. Next week, on the History of Carthage, we'll talk about Hannibal's falling out with Philip and the war in the East.

But despite the obvious rationales for quitting the fight, Rome's determination to carry on was only bolstered by their defeats. The old Roman obstinacy was back with a vengeance. That special blend of honor, pride, and masochism that had seen the Romans through so much would see them through this, their darkest hour, as well.

That is not to say the Romans proceeded through their trial unchanged. On the contrary, the early years of the Second Punic War fundamentally altered life in Rome. It was simultaneously and paradoxically a time of both democratization and consolidation of power in the hands of the elites. Popular agitation and rival political factions had sent out field commanders with diametrically opposed aims, and the confused Roman strategies had been easily exploited by Hannibal. The case of Fabius and Minucius presaged the much greater catastrophe that befell Vero and Paulus.

But after Cannae, the Senate took control of the war, intent on prosecuting the conflict with something resembling a consistent strategy. The tribunes and the popular assemblies were shut out. The need for quick and coherent policies made the slow-turning wheels of democracy not just obsolete, but dangerous. The passions of the mob had sent Vero riding off to an ill-conceived battle that nearly destroyed the empire. The Senate was dead set against letting that sort of thing happen again. The elite seized control, and for the most part, the people were content to go along.

But at the same time the seizure of power was going on, the opportunities for political advancement had never been so readily available. The sons of the great patrician families were strewn across the battlefields of Italy. These young men, who would have filled the leadership positions for a generation, were all dead now. Rome needed praetors and aediles and military tribunes. Anyone, patrician or plebe who showed a little initiative and bravery, was liable to find himself given commands he otherwise could never dream of. The Second Punic War was, by necessity, a time of great turnover in the leadership class, and it was based, again, out of necessity, on merit rather than blood. During this period the cream rose to the top, and Rome was well served for embracing the transition. So yes, the elites took control, but it was a merit-based elite, open to all.

Despite the plausibility that some in Rome would have been more than willing to talk peace with Hannibal, the histories don't mention any internal conflict over what to do, even to vilify some chicken-hearted minority who wanted out of the war. It seems that on the subject of surrender, the Romans were of one mind, and they weren't about to do it. So they re-raised legions from their seeming endless supply of manpower, though, admittedly, it was not as easy as before. They had to both lower the youngest eligible age and raise the oldest eligible age, and, in an unprecedented move, purchased 8,000 slaves from their various citizen-owners and enrolled them into an army of their own under the command of Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus, the great-uncle of the famous Gracchi brothers, who we will get to in a few weeks.

Hannibal's response to his smashing victory at Cannae was, as I said last week, to do nothing. He did not march on Rome and really force the Romans to think about what they were doing. Instead, he returned to his strategy of cutting the Romans off from their allies. And across the extended communication lines of the Mediterranean, Hannibal stayed in contact with his brother Hasdrubal in Spain, and they agreed that Hasdrubal should continue to press against the Romans in Iberia to prevent those stationed there from returning to Italy to fight. The hope was to make the Romans fight for their territory outside of Italy, while Hannibal made them fight on the peninsula itself. The Carthaginian brothers hoped to split the attention of the Romans in order to conquer them.

Retaking Sicily in particular burned in the minds of both, as their father had been forced to leave the island not, as the brothers believed, because he had been bested in the field, but because he had been abandoned by Carthaginian politicians. The history of the stabbed-in-the-back theory stretches, as you can see, far back into antiquity. And in 216 BC, just after the Battle of Cannae, fate stepped in to deliver the island to the Carthaginians. Hyro, king of Syracuse and stalwart ally of Rome, finally died after 53 years on the throne. He was succeeded by his grandson, Hieronymus, who had just turned 15. Though the old king had never faltered in his allegiance to Rome, a large bulk of the nobility was all for breaking away to the Carthaginians, especially after Cannae. When Hieronymus ascended to the throne, the impressionable youth was easily persuaded to invite the Carthaginians onto the island. A treaty was quickly concluded which promised aid to Carthage in return for staying out of internal Sicilian affairs. The young king immediately began operations against the remaining Roman legions on the island.

But Hieronymus proved himself to be the prototypical depraved child tyrant, and his wanton displays of arrogant despotism soon raised the ire of many in Syracuse. There was still a sizable pro-Roman population within the upper class, and while Hieronymus was out on campaign, they had him assassinated, much to the relief of the general public. However, the conspirators then badly overplayed their hand and murdered the rest of Hiero's popular family, and turned public opinion right back against them. Two Carthaginian generals who had been sent to the island to advise Hieronymus were raised up by the Syracusan soldiers and thrust into a position of supreme command. They returned to Syracuse at the head of the army and ousted the pro-Roman leaders of the coup. Suddenly, just like that, a pair of Carthaginian generals were in control of Syracuse and Sicily was back in the hands of Carthage, just as Hannibal dreamed it would be.

News of this unexpected and fortuitous turn of events was music to the ears of Hannibal in Italy and Hasdrubal in Spain. While Hannibal marched south to try and break the already shaky Roman allegiance of Magna Gratia, Hasdrubal attempted to coordinate a campaign against the Scipione brothers. Publius and Gnaeus Scipio, the father and uncle of Scipio Africanus, however, were proving to be more than a match for the Carthaginian army sent against them in Spain. Though Hasdrubal was ostensibly in overall command there, there were three Carthaginian armies in the field and each general had his own idea about what ought to be done and who ought to receive the glory for driving the Romans out of Spain. Plus, the loyalty of the Spanish mercenaries was always in doubt as they made for the hills any time there was real trouble. Nearly five years would pass without either side gaining much of anything in Spain. The Scipiones did manage to take back Saguntum, the city that had started the war, but beyond that not much land changed hands. The Scipiones were making all the right moves and in the tradition of Fabius avoided decisive battles that might knock them out of the fight. As much as the Carthaginians were intent on dividing Roman attention, it was the Romans who were getting the better of splitting the theaters of focus. Hasdrubal was looking to dispatch the Scipiones and make for Italy himself to meet up with Hannibal, but the Romans were not going quietly into that good night.

But then, in 211 BC, the Scipiones made an ill-advised strategic decision that would bring them both to ruin. Bolstered by 20,000 Celtiberian mercenaries, the 30,000 Romans in Spain found themselves in a position where they outnumbered two nearby Carthaginian armies, including the force commanded by Hasdrubal. The Carthaginians had roughly 35,000 men at their disposal and the Scipiones decided time was ripe to punch out the Carthaginians. They split their own army, with Gnaeus leading about a third of the Romans and all the Celtiberians against Hasdrubal, while Publius led the bulk of the Romans against the other Carthaginian army. But, unbeknownst to the Roman generals, the army Publius was attacking was in the process of being reinforced and the Celtiberians under Gnaeus' command had been bribed to desert at the outset of any battle. So, rather than having the advantage on both fronts, the Scipiones were outnumbered everywhere. Publius arrived at his objective first, but after some confused night fighting and the surprise arrival of a large contingent of Numidian cavalry, the Romans were pushed back and then broken. Publius Scipio himself was killed in the fighting while only a small number of his army managed to escape. Unaware of what had happened to his brother, Gnaeus approached Hasdrubal with confidence. The Carthaginians stalled for time until he was sure that things in the north were unfolding according to plan and then formed up for battle. Gnaeus ordered his men out and was horrified to find the Celtiberians, good to their word, at least in this case, immediately deserted. Left with only about 10,000 troops, Gnaeus didn't stand a chance. He oversaw one of the great last stands in history, fortifying a hopeless position with saddles and backpacks and fighting it out to the last man. In the span of a few days, both Roman commanders and the bulk of the legions in Spain lay dead and five years of careful campaigning had been for naught.

Now I know what you're thinking, how is it that the Romans lost every decisive battle and still managed to win the war? Well I'll tell you, they didn't lose every decisive battle in the war. In fact, at the same time the Romans were losing in Spain, they were winning in Sicily.

Back on the island, the Romans sent Marcus Claudius Marcellus to reinforce the two legions already stationed on the island at the time of Hyrule's death. These numbers included the survivors of Cannae who were forced to serve in exile in Sicily without leave or any hope at all really of returning home. Broadly speaking, the troops who survived Cannae did their best to die in battle where they could at least reclaim some of their lost honor. Marcellus's orders were simple, take back Sicily and regain control of the vital food supplies Rome needed to survive with Hannibal off ravaging the Italian countryside. Marcellus immediately ordered a siege of Syracuse. The city had yet to be taken by an invading army and had repelled all comers quite handily over the years, but Marcellus was intent on conquering the unconquerable city. His first attempt though failed spectacularly, just as had all the others. The ace in the hole of the Syracusans was their great mathematician, physicist, astronomer, inventor and all-around super genius Archimedes who designed a number of defensive weapons for the city to help repel invaders. For the current war effort, Archimedes had designed grappling hooks that could be lowered from the walls and affect risk-free devastation on Roman naval assaults as well as catapults that launched ridiculously sized boulders at the Romans with ease. It should come as no surprise to anyone that the great scientist died at the hands of a Roman soldier after the city was taken.

Fuelled in his initial assault, Marcellus settled in to starve the city out. Two and a half years would pass before the stalemate was broken. A group of pro-Roman nobles slipped through the lines and arranged to betray the city into Roman hands. The Romans timed an attack to coincide with a local festival and managed to scale the walls and take control of most of the city before they were detected. The Carthaginian generals in charge retreated behind an inner wall holing up in the citadel of the city. Another stalemate ensued. The Carthaginians attempted to relieve the city by sending a number of fleets but a combination of foul weather and Roman interference kept most help away. To make matters worse, a plague swept across Italy in 211 BC, decimating the Carthaginian army looking for an opportunity to aid the Syracusans and bringing those trapped inside to their knees. After being abandoned by the Carthaginian generals, those still holding out inside the city surrendered and Marcellus claimed Syracuse for Rome.

Then, in an uncharacteristic display of barbarism, Marcellus turned his troops loose on the city with permission to haul off anything they could. It was in the course of this looting that Archimedes was killed. The sack of Syracuse shocked even the Romans, who still looked with reverence on the great Greek city, and were horrified to hear how poorly its citizens, art, and treasure had been treated. However, they were not so torn up that they did not celebrate novation for Marcellus upon his return to Rome.

So we'll leave Rome on an upbeat this week after ending the last two episodes with devastating Roman defeats. Even though they had lost the initiative in Spain, they had turned the situation in Sicily around and secured most of the island once again for Rome. Next week, we will return to Italy and trace the movement of Hannibal during these years and follow the Romans as they followed Hannibal around and flip back cities Hannibal had flipped to the Carthaginian cause. There were few out-and-out battles between the two armies, just a lot of territory swapping and internal political machinations between rival factions inside the Italian cities. We will also introduce next week young Scipio Africanus, who would take command of the situation in Spain and attempt to avenge his father's defeat there. Only 25 at the time, he was given the command at this unprecedented age not because he displayed any great ability or seemed to be the savior of Rome, but rather because he was the only one who volunteered for the job.