020b - The First Punic War

Hello, and welcome to the History of Rome, episode 20b, the First Punic War. After years of inconclusive fighting on and around Sicily, the Romans decided the time had finally come to stop fighting the tentacles of the Carthaginian Empire and stab right at its heart. They assembled a massive invasion fleet of 350 ships on the southern coast of Sicily and in 256 BC set sail for Africa. Though they were stalled by one of the largest naval battles in history, the Romans were able to regroup and set out once again, no worse for the wear. They had been set back a few months, which threw a small monkey wrench into their plans, but the Romans remained focused and confident that they were on their way to sack Carthage and end the war.

In charge of the operation was the senior consul for the year, Marcus Attilius Regulus. Originally, the plan in place had been to land about 50 miles southeast of Carthage, disembark the legions, set up a defensive perimeter, and begin the march on the enemy city. The logic behind landing down the road from Carthage and not right on their doorstep was two-fold. First, the waters immediately surrounding Carthage were patrolled by the weakened but still powerful Carthaginian navy. The Romans concluded that any resistance they faced at sea would be far stiffer than any they met on land. Second, the Romans had no illusions about the ease of taking a great city like Carthage, so just as they had done with Syracuse, they knew they needed to isolate Carthage and cut off its supply lines. So, as the legions made their way to Carthage, they were supposed to convince locals along the way that Carthage was doomed and it was time to join the Roman side. Once the infantry reached Carthage, the bulk of the fleet would set up a blockade of the city outside the reach of the Carthaginian navy, but still standing between Carthage and its maritime supply routes.

It was a good plan, but the Battle of Ecnamos had set it all back a few months, and by the time the Romans finally landed in Africa, winter was fast approaching. There was no way to provision the entire force, which included something like 75,000 rowers, so just like that, the carefully laid plan was tossed out and improvisation commenced. Most of the fleet was ordered back to Sicily, leaving Regulus in Africa with 15,000 infantry and 500 cavalry. His instructions were to hold the Roman position for the winter and do his level best to begin the process of turning Carthage's allies against them. Regulus, though, had in mind for himself the glory of ending the war and decided to march for Carthage anyway, with or without naval support. He still understood the wisdom of isolating the Carthaginians, though, and attack Carthage's North African allies along the way.

It was at one of these stops, about 40 miles from Carthage at the city of Adas, that the Romans met their first real resistance from the Carthaginian army. However, afraid of meeting the Romans out on the plains, the Carthaginians took to the hills where they figured the strength of the legions would be diminished. This, however, was a disastrous strategy for two reasons. First, the Romans had just spent 60 years locked in a mortal death struggle with the Samnite and had learned every trick in the book when it came to hill fighting. And second, the one true superiority of the Carthaginian ground forces was their cavalry, which, in the hills, were effectively taken out of the fight altogether. So after the Carthaginian generals carefully set themselves up to fail, all that was left to do was take the field and do just that. The Romans marched up into the hills and dislodged the Carthaginians with ease, driving them out of the area. The city of Adas then surrendered without further resistance.

The Carthaginian Senate was now beside itself. Its army had been dispatched with ease and the Romans were on the move. Adding to their despair, reports began to arrive that the fragile Carthaginian domination of the Libyans and Numidians was breaking down and revolts were flaring up. The defection of the Numidians was particularly distressing. In the whole of the Mediterranean, the Numidians were by far the best horsemen. Without the Numidian cavalry riding with them, the one advantage the Carthaginians did have would go out the window. Cut off from their allies and without an army strong enough to oppose the legions, the only option left to Carthage seemed to be negotiation. The riding was on the wall and when the Romans finally did arrive at Carthage, envoys, not an army, were sent to greet them.

Regulus agreed to meet with them and by all accounts was about to receive significant concessions from the Carthaginians and bring an end to the long war when fate, or rather ego, stepped in. Intemperate in his demands, Regulus laid terms of surrender so preposterous that the Carthaginians were forced to refuse. He demanded the Carthaginians leave Sicily, Corsica, and Sardinia forever, that they completely dismantle their navy, pay a huge punitive fine to Rome, and, as a final humiliation, sign a treaty that would place Carthage under the sovereignty of the Roman Senate. The Carthaginian envoys were shocked. Regulus was essentially acting as if he had defeated the Carthaginians in battle and was imposing terms rather than bargaining with a weak but still unconquered city. The Carthaginians were better off rejecting the terms and praying for a miracle than just giving away the farm without making the Romans even work for it. So the envoys returned to Carthage and announced that they had failed to give up, which is pretty hard to do when you think about it.

But all was not completely lost for the Carthaginians. They had sent out feelers across the Mediterranean looking for aid and had hit upon a good lead in Greece, specifically in the legendarily martial city of Sparta. At the same time that negotiations were underway with Regulus, word came that a Spartan general with a small but lethal force of Greek mercenaries were on their way. The Carthaginian Senate hoped that this army from the east would turn out to be the miracle they had prayed for. So as Regulus settled in for the winter and dreamed of the triumph he would receive when the Carthaginians finally came to their senses, the Greek army arrived, and though Regulus did not realize it yet, kicked glory out of his reach.

The Spartan general, Xanthippus, set to work immediately by interviewing Carthaginian soldiers present at the Battle of Aetus. He was shocked to hear how badly the Carthaginian generals had mucked things up and concluded quickly that there was nothing wrong with the Carthaginian army itself, just its leadership. He was further convinced when he was tasked by the Carthaginian Senate with drilling their army into shape. As he watched them, he realized there was nothing wrong with the infantry, the cavalry was magnificent, and the war elephants practically indestructible. He reported to the Senate that they had nothing to fear from the Romans and, as soon as spring came, advised them to immediately challenge the legions in the open plains. The Senate was skeptical, but Xanthippus eventually moved them to order the attack.

When spring did arrive and no treaty had been reached, Regulus began to get fidgety. When the Roman fleet returned to North Africa, they were sure to bring the new consuls for the year with them. Regulus had won the Battle of Ecnomus, landed in North Africa, and marched to the gates of Carthage. Now, with victory in his grasp, he was about to have to hand the baton off in the final fifty yards of the marathon and let some newbie cross the finish line and get all the glory. The clock was ticking, not on Rome's chances in North Africa, but on Regulus' chance to be the center of attention at the victory party.

When the newly confident Carthaginian army marched out into the plains beside Carthage, with Xanthippus at its head, Regulus would have been wise to stall for time and wait for reinforcements from Rome to guarantee victory. His army was not large and had just spent the winter in enemy territory, but, blinded by vanity, he jumped at the chance to fight. Conventional wisdom was that the Carthaginians were no match for the legions out in the open, and when Regulus saw them march out, his head was filled with visions of dining in Carthage that very night, which, of course, he did, just not in the way he imagined.

The battle, to say the least, was an unmitigated disaster for Rome. Xanthippus saw clearly the advantage his superior cavalry afforded him, and Regulus' infantry deployment all but guaranteed Carthaginian victory before the battle even began. Xanthippus placed the war elephant at the head of his army and the cavalry on the wings. Regulus responded by deepening his lines so the elephants could not break through them completely, but in order to do so, he had to sacrifice the width of his front. He essentially flipped the retcangle that was his army so that the short end, rather than the broad side, were facing the Carthaginians. When Xanthippus saw Regulus order the new deployment, he knew victory was in his grasp. With the shortened front, the Romans would be easily outflanked by the Carthaginian cavalry. Regulus couldn't have played into Xanthippus' hands more if he had tried.

The battle began when Xanthippus sent the elephants in, who duly caused their patented brand of havoc. While the Romans were focused on the giant beasts, he ordered out the cavalry, which rooted their Roman counterparts easily. And just as the Romans were getting a handle on the elephants, they were hit from both sides by the Carthaginian cavalry. The Romans, now besieged from all fronts, fought for their lives, surging forward in an attempt to break out of the cavalry pincer. But waiting for them was the fresh, and so far unused, Carthaginian infantry. The exhausted Romans didn't stand a chance. Of the 15,000 or so who entered the battle, only 2,000 made it out alive. Of these, around 500 were taken prisoner, including Regulus himself, who, as I said, did indeed dine in Carthage that very evening, his hands hobbled by chains.

When the Roman fleet finally arrived, it was not to preside over a final victory for Rome, but rather to pick up the pitiful survivors of a devastated army. The Roman adventure in North Africa was over, and it would be 50 years before they would attempt anything so audacious again. That time, though, young Scipio Africanus would lead the invasion, and secure a much better result. To add insult to injury, when the Roman ships were returning from North Africa, a storm kicked up and sank the entire fleet. It was one of the worst maritime disasters in history. 100,000 men drowned, just like that.

After news of the disaster reached Rome, the Senate took stock of the situation, and realized that after 10 years of fighting, they were right back at square one. Xanthippus, clearly the best thing to ever happen to Carthage, was rewarded for his victory with public acclaim and private threats. The Carthaginian nobility was threatened by the brilliant Greek tactician, and it was not long before Xanthippus, fearing he would be assassinated by the jealous nobility if he remained in Carthage, left the city for good. The loss of so great a commander did nothing to help the Carthaginian war effort. It was one of the great blunders of the war that the nobility let their own paranoia take precedence over actually winning the fight. Xanthippus could have done great things for them, but he was never given a chance.

The war now returned to Sicily. The Romans, with their seemingly bottomless reserves of men and money, enlisted tens of thousands of new soldiers and sent them off to continue the fight. Just as had happened before, though, years of inconclusive fighting followed, and it led the Romans to conclude that they had to do something drastic to bring this interminable conflict to an end. The decision was made to attack the Carthaginian stronghold of Lillebom on the northwest coast of the island. A victory there would mean the end of a Carthaginian presence on Sicily, and the Romans prepared for the attack with all the energy and skill they could muster. They built a fleet of about 80 ships to blockade Lillebom's harbor and ordered the bulk of their land forces to the city with instructions to bring it to its knees. But despite the massive investment of time and money into siege equipment and provisions, the Carthaginians simply would not be moved. They had little trouble running the blockade, which the inexperienced Romans did a poor job of maintaining, and they kept themselves well supplied.

In 249 B.C., after about a year of getting nowhere, new consuls arrived at Lillebom, and one of them, Publius Claudius Pulcher, brought with him a bold plan. He gathered the military tribunes together and made his pitch. The Carthaginian fleet, which was anchored not far down the coast at a city called Drapana, believed the Romans were set on maintaining the blockade and posed no real threat. If the Romans sailed their 120-odd ships down the coast at night, they could surprise the Carthaginians and destroy their navy before they knew what hit them. Their ability to run the blockade crippled, it would only be a matter of time before Lillebom fell. With the eloquent certainty of a true Claudii, Pulcher won over the troops and preparations for the raid began immediately.

However, Pulcher made one huge mistake at the outside of the operation that sealed his fate and secured his place in Roman history not as a great hero, but one of its greatest goats. Setting out for Drapana, he ordered that the auspices be taken and the sacred chickens consulted. In the great litany of Roman superstition, consulting with the sacred chickens has always been my personal favorite. A flock of chickens were always carried around with the army, and just before a battle, an auger would scatter feed in front of them. If the sacred chickens ate, it meant victory was assured, but if they did not, the prudent commander held up his attack for another day. Pulcher, however, had no time for such ridiculous piety, and when the sacred chickens refused to eat, he ordered them thrown overboard, saying famously, if they're not hungry, maybe they're thirsty. He sailed off into battle, though how he expected to win without the approval of the sacred chickens is a mystery.

The debacle that followed left the Carthaginians stronger than ever. Pulcher's fleet got started late and was noticed by Carthaginian lookouts before they were within striking distance. They immediately responded by outmaneuvering and trapping Pulcher's fleet against the coast where they were smashed against the rocks. Of the 120 Roman ships that set sail, only 30 returned. The dream of taking Lillebom had now passed into complete fantasy. The other consul for the year attempted to reprovision the Roman troops left at Lillebom by sailing around the south end of the island, but lost all his ships in yet another storm. He himself managed to survive and make his way to Lillebom, where he declared an end to the siege and withdrew. When the First Punic War finally ended eight years later, Lillebom remained unconquered.

But the Romans were not done yet. They withdrew their troops to Mount Erex, a mountain in the west center of the island. By taking this strategic high ground, they were able to bottle up the Carthaginian land forces in their two garrisons, Lillebom and Drapana. The war had now come full circle. The Romans controlled the land and the Carthaginians the sea. Neither was strong enough to beat the other in their respective sphere of dominance and a new stalemate commenced.

By this time though, both sides were broke and short of manpower and facing problems elsewhere. The Gauls were stirring on Rome's northern frontier and North Africa was in revolt against Carthaginian rule. The enemies of Rome and Carthage seemed to have finally noticed that the two combatants were beating each other into a state of exhaustion in Sicily and set about trying to exploit the situation. So for the next seven years, Sicily became a neglected backwater war zone. The Carthaginians, under the command of a new general, Hamilcar Baracca, was reduced to running a guerrilla war and hoping that the Romans would just quit the island out of frustration. The center of the action was at Mount Erex, where the strongest Roman garrison was stationed and where Hamilcar directed the majority of his attacks. In 244 BC, Hamilcar finally managed to drive the Romans out and hold the high ground for himself. For the next three years, he would use the mountain as a base while he prosecuted his asymmetrical war against the Romans, undermanned and undersupplied by the Carthaginian Senate who, after a political party shift, had lost all interest in the war against Rome.

Seeing Carthaginian interest at an all-time low, the Romans decided to make their final, final push to win the war. After failing first in North Africa and then at Lillebom, the Romans, eternal optimists that they were, decided that the time for victory had finally come. They built a new, new fleet, starting a navy from scratch for the fourth time of the war. The Carthaginian fleet had been removed from Sicily after the disappearance of Rome from the seas a few years earlier, and there was nothing standing in the way of the Romans as they once again blockaded Lillebom and Drapana, the last two Carthaginian outposts on the island. This time the blockades worked and the garrisons were slowly starved out. The Carthaginians suddenly became interested in Sicily again and launched their entire fleet to drive the Romans off, but the hastily mustered crews were this time less experienced than the Romans, who had been at sea for some time. Around the northwest coast of Sicily, the last battle of the war was fought, the Romans decisively routing the Carthaginian navy.

The garrisons about to fall and with no way of keeping himself provisioned, Hamilcar reluctantly opened negotiations with the Romans. The final treaty, hammered out by Hamilcar and his Roman counterpart, read, there shall be peace between the Carthaginians and the Romans, subject to the approval by the Roman people, upon these conditions. The Carthaginians shall relinquish every part of Sicily, they are not to make war against Tyre nor do anything to disturb the Syracusans or their allies. All the Roman prisoners will be returned without ransom and a tribute of 200 talents of silver paid within 20 years.

Returning to Carthage, Hamilcar immediately began to look elsewhere for an opportunity to make up for Carthage's loss of Sicily and set his sights on Spain. He did not forget the humiliation of having to abandon Mount Erex, however, and as he sailed north with his eldest son Hannibal in tow, he made the nine-year-old boy swear an oath of eternal hatred for the Romans, which the boy did. It was an oath Hannibal never forgot and he would dedicate his entire life to the destruction of the Romans, the mortal enemy of his family.

The First Punic War was now over and Rome was the clear victor. However, the peace settlement did not address the larger issues still facing the two strongest empires in the western Mediterranean. Yes, Rome had won control of Sicily and the Carthaginians had been forced to retreat, but the North Africans were undeterred in their quest for territorial expansion. The First Punic War settled the issue of who controlled the island of Sicily but did nothing to settle the larger issues of who controlled the greater Mediterranean. In that larger game, the Carthaginians still obviously felt confident that they could win.

The First Punic War, as I said last week, was marked by poor judgment on both sides and ironically it was the victorious Romans who seemed to make more boneheaded moves than the defeated Carthaginians. Regulus blew an opportunity to end the war and because he let his ego get in the way, the conflict dragged on ten years longer than it should have. The neophyte Roman sailors managed to lose two entire fleets to storms, storms they were warned about in advance by the way, and another to Claudius Pulcher's botched midnight raid. If it had been anyone else, each of these disasters by themselves would have been enough to shut down the war, but the Romans were able to absorb the losses and it was their deep pockets more than battlefield skill which they rode to victory.

The Carthaginians, for their part, found themselves succumbing as much to the reputation of the Romans as anything else. Despite the fact that Xanthippus clearly demonstrated that the Romans could be beaten on land, the Carthaginians were reluctant to invest in their land forces. After the last of their fleet was dashed on the rocks in 248 BC, the Romans essentially ceded the water to Carthage. But with one theater of the war now shut down, the Carthaginians failed to capitalize on it and divert resources to the other theater and left Hamilcar to run a guerrilla war on a shoestring budget rather than give him men and money to prosecute a real ground attack. The winner of the first Punic War was always going to be the side that succeeded on the other team's field. So it went to the Romans who finally raised one last navy. If the Carthaginians had sucked it up and done the same thing, only building an army rather than a navy, they may have succeeded in pushing the war-weary Romans off the island. It would have been an interesting historical turn had that occurred.

The war marked the first time Rome fought outside of Italy and had they lost, overseas fighting may have left a bad enough taste in their mouth that they would have contented themselves with merely an Italian empire. As it stood now, however, Rome's first overseas adventure had left them with a rich new province and it merely whetted their appetite for more.

Next week, we will cover the years between the First and Second Punic Wars. Rome would face a Gallic army pressing down from the north and also make their first foray east, landing an army on the far side of the Adriatic. All the while, Carthage was consolidating its holdings in Spain. Both sides knew the peace between them could not last forever. It was only a matter of time before hostilities between the two great powers resumed. In 218 BC, the peace would finally break and Hannibal Baracca would make good on his oath, descend into Italy, and wreck havoc not just in the Roman countryside, but in the Roman